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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brant Lee Eversole appeals from his judgment of conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Mr. Eversole pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from 
the denial of his pre-trial motions. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress because State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), has been abrogated 
by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Alternatively, if this Court 
believes that Diaz has not been abrogated by McNeely, Mr. Eversole asserts that Diaz 
should be overruled. He also asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion 
to dismiss. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Eversole with charged with felony Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter, 
DUI), I.C. §§ 18-8004(1)(a), 18-8005(9). (R., p.49.) He filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting that the vehicle was not subject to being readily made operable at the time he 
was arrested. (R., p.92.) Specifically, Mr. Eversole asserted that he was stuck on a 
"brick burm" when law enforcement arrived and the vehicle could not be driven. 
(R., p.93.) The State objected, asserting that this was a determination for the jury. 
(R., p.107.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.138.) 
Mr. Eversole then filed a motion to suppress asserting that evidence of his blood 
alcohol content should be suppressed, because the search violated both the Idaho and 
United States Constitution. (R., p.148.) He asserted that a per se implied consent rule 
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allowing for warrantless blood draws was unconstitutional, and that the State had not 
demonstrated an exigency. (R., p.150.) 
Mr. Eversole and the State stipulated to the facts in the motion to suppress. 
(R., p.170.) These facts are: 
1. On April 16, 2011, Mr. Eversole was arrested for driving under the 
influence in Firth, in Bingham County; 
2. Bingham County Sheriff's Deputy Chad Morgan alleges that 
Mr. Eversole was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle at the 
time of his arrest; 
3. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Eversole refused to provide a breath 
sample for the purposes of determining his blood alcohol content; 
4. Upon this refusal, Deputy Morgan transported Mr. Eversole to Bingham 
Memorial Hospital where Tiffany Henderson, a technician in the lab, 
drew Mr. Eversole's blood pursuant to Deputy Morgan's request; and 
5. Deputy Morgan did not have a warrant for the blood draw. 
(R., pp.170-21.) The district court denied the motion to suppress holding that it was 
bound by State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007). (R., p.173.) The parties entered into 
plea negotiations. (R., pp.182, 190.) Mr. Eversole then entered a binding Alford plea. 
(R., p.195.) He preserved the right to appeal any pre-trial motion. (R., p.193.) 
However, Mr. Eversole subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the 
motion to suppress, relying on the recently-released opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 
S.Ct. 1552 (2013). (R., p.202.) The State objected, asserting that because 
Mr. Eversole had already entered a plea, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
motion to reconsider. (R., p.252.) 
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The court denied the motion at the sentencing hearing, holding that it was still 
bound by Diaz. 1 (R., p.264.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, 
with three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.268.) Mr. Eversole 
appealed. (R., p.272.) 
1 The State's assertion that the district court no longer had the authority to reconsider 
the suppression motion after the entry of the Alford plea is well taken. However, it is 
immaterial for purposes of the argument on appeal, as McNeely applies retroactively to 
all cases pending on direct review. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eversole's motion to suppress? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eversole's motion to dismiss? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Eversole asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress because State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), has been abrogated by 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Alternatively, if this Court 
believes that Diaz has not been abrogated by McNeely, Mr. Everole asserts that Diaz 
should be overruled. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, this Court defers to the district 
court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and exercises free review over the 
district court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been 
satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,470 (2001). 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause." A warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a 
recognized exception. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case, which involved a 
compelled physical intrusion beneath Mr. Eversole's skin and into his veins to obtain a 
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sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation. "Such an invasion of 
bodily integrity implicates an individual's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations 
of privacy." Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 
489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy 
burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993). If evidence is not 
seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence 
discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed a blood draw as a 
Fourth Amendment violation. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In 
Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at a bar in a bowling 
alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car which the 
petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Id. Both the 
petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment. Id. At 
the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the 
petitioner. Id. at 758. The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the 
petitioner's blood, which indicated intoxication, and such results were admitted at 
petitioner's trial. Id. at 759. The petitioner objected to the admission of the results, 
arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. Id. 
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The Schmerber Court found no Fourth Amendment violation stemming from the 
warrantless taking of the petitioner's blood under the unique facts of the case. 
Specifically, the Court relied on the destruction of blood evidence as a relevant factor in 
the exigency determination under the following circumstances: the officer investigating 
the accident encountered the defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of 
alcohol; the passenger in defendant's car was injured and taken to the hospital; the 
investigating officer arrived at the hospital where defendant was being treated almost 
two hours after the accident; and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest. The 
Schmerber Court stated: 
that the percentage of alcohol in the blood 
shortly after drinking stops, as the body ..... ,,,,,,,,,, to 
it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where 
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate 
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and 
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt 
to secure evidence of blood alcohol content in this case was an 
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. 
Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 
However, the Court did not establish a per se rule: 
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the 
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a 
cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution 
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In 1989, this Court decided State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 ( 1989). The 
Woolery Court first held that the metabolism of alcohol in the blood provided an inherent 
emergency which justified the warrantless search. Id. The Court then turned to the 
question of whether the test results should have been excluded because the officer did 
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not comply with I.C. § 18-8002. Id. at 371. After exploring cases from other 
jurisdictions, this Court concluded, 
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to refuse to submit 
to an evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood alcohol level. It is 
difficult to believe that the Idaho Legislature would provide an individual 
with the statutory right to prevent the state from obtaining highly relevant 
evidence when a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe 
the individual has committed a crime - whether it would be driving under 
the influence, vehicular manslaughter, sale or controlled substances, or 
murder. If the driver's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures is complied with, the state should not be prevented 
from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol content of the 
driver's blood. 
Id. at 373 (emphasis added). Thus, this holding in Woolery is that, when the search is 
otherwise constitutional, I.C. § 18-8002 does not create a statutory right to revoke 
consent. This Court characterized the issue as follows: "the issue on appeal is whether 
the trial court erred in admitting appellant's blood alcohol content test results either 
because the officer requesting such test did not have reasonable grounds to administer 
the test or because appellant was not informed of his rights pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002." 
Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370. 
In 2002, in an appeal from a driver's license suspension, this Court held that, 
"every driver who drives on Idaho roads has impliedly consented to submit to a BAC 
when properly requested by an officer." Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). 
Halen involved only a license suspension as a result of the petitioner's refusal to take a 
BAC test; it was not a criminal case where the defendant sought suppression of the test. 
In fact, it appears that no search was done because, after Halen refused, he "was 
informed that his driver's license was being suspended based upon his refusal to submit 
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to a BAG." Id. at 831. Halen, "never submitted to a SAC test about which to conduct 
discovery." Id. at 835. 
Building on Halen, in 2007, this Court decided State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 
(2007). In Diaz, the defendant was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol 
and was transported by the arresting officer to a local hospital where his blood was 
drawn. Id. at 302. The defendant did not physically resist either being transported to 
the hospital or the taking of his blood, but orally protested the blood draw. Id. The 
Defendant was ultimately charged with felony DUI based on prior convictions, and he 
sought to suppress his blood test results, arguing that the test was involuntary and not 
justified by exigent circumstances. Id. 
This Court rejected this argument, concluding that the blood draw could be 
justified either by exigent circumstances or consent. Id. The Court reasoned that 
because the defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving 
on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at 303. Given the 
Court's finding that the forcible blood draw was consensual, the Court went on to 
consider the reasonableness of the blood draw under the Fourth Amendment, in light of 
the totality of the circumstances including: (1) whether the procedure was done in a 
medically acceptable manner; and (2) whether the procedure was done without 
unreasonable force. Id. Finding the blood draw to be reasonable, the Court then 
considered whether I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) permits officers to order involuntary blood 
draws absent offenses such as aggravated DUI or vehicular manslaughter. Id. The 
Court found that the statute provides no protection to drivers, but only to hospital 
professionals, and does nothing more than limit when an officer may request, rather 
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than order, hospital personnel to draw a driver's blood against the driver's will. Id. at 
303-304. 
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a 
DUI investigation, by itself, justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement. 
Missouri v. McNeely 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1558 (2013). In McNeely, the respondent 
was validly stopped and, after declining to take a breath test, was arrested and taken to 
a nearby hospital for a blood draw. Id. at 1557-1558. At the hospital, Mr. McNeely 
refused to consent to the blood draw, but the officer ordered the technician to take the 
blood anyway. Id. The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant. Id. 
Mr. McNeely's blood alcohol content ("SAC") measured at .154 percent. Id. McNeely's 
suppression motion was granted and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court's order granting suppression of the BAC results, relying on Schmerber. Id. The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits as to 
whether "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se 
exigency that it suffices on its own to justify and exception to the warrant requirement. .. 
" Id. at 1558. 
The McNeely Court held that it did not: "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be 
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do that." Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1561. The Court first 
recognized the importance of the privacy interest at stake, holding that "absent an 
emergency, no less [than a warrant] could be required where intrusions in to the human 
body are concerned," and that the importance of a determination by a neutral and 
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detached magistrate before law enforcement is allowed to "invade another's body in 
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great." Id. at 1558. The Court reiterated 
what was seemingly forgotten by lower courts after Schmerber. to determine whether an 
officer faced an emergency which would justify alleviating the requirement of a warrant, 
the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559. 
As part of the analysis, the Court observed that the dissipation of alcohol in the 
blood stream is different "in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in 
which the police are truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation." Id. at 1561 ( citing 
Rhoaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973)). While BAC evidence from an alleged 
drunk driver naturally dissipates over time, its dissipation is gradual and relatively 
predictable. Id. In addition, there is always a time gap at issue in each case where the 
officer has to transport the suspect to the place where the blood is to be drawn and is 
required to read all of the administrative license suspension warnings to each suspect. 
Id. These delays, in conjunction with advances in technology making it much easier to 
obtain a warrant, making the use of a per se rule unreasonable and violative of the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1561-1562. The Court concluded, "[w]e hold that in drunk-
driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not 
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without 
a warrant." Id. at 1568. McNeely abrogates Woolery's holding that dissipation of 
alcohol is a per se exigency. Id. at 1558, n.2 
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1. The District Court Correctly Held That The State Had Failed To 
Demonstrate An Exigency 
In this case, the district court first held that it could not conclude from the record 
that an exigency existed. (R., pp.177-78.) Mr. Eversole has no dispute with the court's 
findings in this regard. However, had the court determined that dissipation, per se, was 
an exigency, this would have been error pursuant to McNeely. 
2. The District Court Incorrectly Held That the Blood Draw Was Valid 
Pursuant To Implied Consent 
The district court next held, pursuant to State v. Diaz, that the blood draw in this 
case was justified by implied consent. (R., p.178.) Mr. Eversole submits that Diaz has 
been abrogated by McNeely. Additionally, he asserts that, if this Court believes that 
McNeely does not address the implied consent issue, Diaz must still be overruled. 
In McNeely, while addressing an exigent circumstances issue, the Court held that 
the use of a per se rule was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment. 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-1562. However, determining that implied consent justifies 
the search in this case simply seeks to replace a per se exigency exception with a per 
se implied consent exception. This also violates the Fourth Amendment. The McNeely 
Court specifically stated, "[h]ere and in its own courts the State based its case on an 
insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without 
any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect." Id. at 1568. Yet, this is exactly what 
Diaz allows, albeit under the theory of implied consent. 
The McNeely Court used a totality of the circumstances analysis because a 
"case-by case assessment of exigency" was the traditional test. Id. at 1561. The 
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traditional test for consent is also a totality of the circumstances test. See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho 
156 (1980). Thus, the proper test for determining consent is the totality of the 
circumstances. The State has the burden of proving that consent was "freely and 
voluntarily" given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543 (1968). "[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact 
'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of 
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 227. And, "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into 
account." Id. A blanket holding that implied consent always justifies a warrantless 
search where there is reasonable grounds to believe the defendant has been driving 
under the influence of alcohol relieves the state of this burden, because proving that 
consent has been "implied" does not establish that it was "freely and voluntarily" given. 
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that consent can be refused, which is not taken 
into consideration with a per se implied consent rule. Id. Idaho's implied consent 
statute cannot reduce or rescind the basic and fundamental protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) 
(state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make 
searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within 
the category of statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, 
which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional 
searches.") 
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The United States Supreme Court did briefly address implied consent statutes in 
a section that failed to carry a majority. However, the Court did not even remotely 
suggest that implied consent could constitute a per se exception to the warrant 
requirement. The Court stated, 
As an initial matter, States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce 
their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking 
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have 
adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of 
operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if 
they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving 
offense. See NHTSA Review 173; supra, at 1556 (describing Missouri's 
implied consent law). Such laws impose significant consequences 
when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist's driver's 
license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow 
the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence 
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See NHTSA 
Review 173-175; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554, 
563-564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that the use of 
such an adverse inference does not violate the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination). 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (emphasis added). Thus, this section of the opinion seems 
to take the position that States may use the penalties for withdrawing implied consent to 
enforce their DUI laws, not that implied consent is a per se exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
Further, a recent grant of certiorari suggests that the Supreme Court believes 
that McNeely is relevant to the implied consent issue. In Aviles v. State, 385 S.W. 3d 
110 (Ct. App. Tex. 2012), the Court of Appeals of Texas held that, despite the fact that 
the defendant refused testing, because the warrantless blood draw was conducted in 
accordance with Texas's implied consent law, there was no Fourth Amendment 
violation. Id. at 115. 
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The defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Aviles v. 
Texas, 2014 WL 102362 (Jan. 13, 2014). The Supreme Court order states the 
following: "the motion for petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition 
for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded 
to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, for further consideration in light of 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._ (2013)." Thus, far from apparently endorsing implied 
consent laws, the Court is now granting writs of certiorari and vacating judgments that 
rely solely on implied consent. 
Notably, the Supreme Court of Arizona recent issued an opinion in agreement 
with Mr. Eversole's argument. See State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 (2013). In Butler, the 
defendant, a juvenile, admitted to officers that he had driven to school after smoking 
marijuana. Id. at 611. After being given his warnings pursuant to Arizona's implied 
consent statute, the defendant "agreed verbally and in writing to have his blood drawn." 
Id. The Butler Court held that, "independent of [Arizona's implied consent statute], the 
Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary to justify a 
warrantless blood draw. If the arrestee is a juvenile, the youth's age and a parent's 
presence are relevant, though not necessarily determinative, factors that courts should 
consider in assessing whether consent was voluntary under the circumstances." Id. at 
613. 
The court then conducted a totality of the circumstances analysis, stating, 
Although Tyler did not testify at the suppression hearing, sufficient 
evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that he did not voluntarily 
consent to the blood draw. At the time, Tyler was nearly seventeen and in 
eleventh grade. He had been arrested once previously, but not 
adjudicated delinquent. Tyler was detained for about two hours in a school 
room in the presence of school officials and a deputy. Neither of his 
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parents was present. Tyler initially was shaking and visibly nervous. When 
he became loud and upset after being told he was being arrested, the 
deputy placed him in handcuffs until he calmed down. A second deputy 
sheriff arrived before the blood draw was taken. After removing the 
handcuffs, the first deputy read the implied consent admonition to Tyler, 
once verbatim and once in what the deputy termed "plain English," 
concluding with the statement, "You are, therefore, required to submit to 
the specified tests." Tyler then assented to the blood draw. 
Id. at 613-14. The court thus concluded that, despite the implied consent statute and 
the fact that the defendant assented to the draw, there was no abuse of discretion by 
the juvenile court in its determination that the defendant's consent was involuntary. Id. 
In sum, because McNeely rejects per se rules in favor of a totality of the 
circumstances test, the district court was incorrect in its conclusion that the blood draw 
in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. The State has not shown, based on a totality of the circumstances, that 
Mr. Eversole freely and voluntarily consented to the blood draw. In fact, the record 
reveals that he refused testing. The decision of the district court should therefore be 
reversed. 
3. Diaz And Any Other Case That Holds That Implied Consent By Itself 
Justifies A Blood Draw Should Be Overruled 
Mr. Eversole asserts that, even if this Court concludes that McNeely does not 
abrogate Diaz, Diaz and any other case that holds that Idaho motorists have impliedly 
consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that 
the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance should be overruled. It 
is well recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis need not be strictly adhered to if the 
precedent in question is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, 
or if overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
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continued injustice. State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 
(1990)). Mr. Eversole asserts that Diaz was manifestly wrong and should be overruled. 
According to Diaz, by obtaining a driver's license, Idaho motorists have impliedly 
consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that 
the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance. To the extent Diaz 
holds that Idaho's implied consent statute creates a per se rule that suffices on its own 
as an exception to the warrant requirement, it cannot comport with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
As is set forth above, the Fourth Amendment requires consent to be 
demonstrated by the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho 156 (1980). The State has the 
burden of proving that consent was "freely and voluntarily" given. Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). "[T]he question [of] 
whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all 
the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. And, "knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account." Id. Idaho's implied consent 
statute cannot reduce or rescind the basic and fundamental protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens by the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) 
(state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make 
searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within 
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the category of statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause, 
which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional 
searches.") 
Further, consent can be withdrawn at any time. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S.at 
227, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 348 (1991) (holding that a suspect may "delimit as he 
chooses the scope of the search to which he consents," in the context of a vehicle 
search); United States v. Mcweeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a 
suspect is free ... after initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her consent 
at any time," in the context of a stop and frisk); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 
(8th Cir. 2005) ("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United States v. 
Lockett, 406 F.3d 907 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right to 
revoke his consent in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348 
F.3d 281 (1 st Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v. 
Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle 
search); United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1993) (same, in the context 
of a luggage search). Mr. Eversole submits that irrevocable implied consent cannot 
exist in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
By holding that I.C. § 18-8002 provides for consent, by itself, this Court has 
abandoned the totality of the circumstances test required by Schneckloth. And, based 
upon the fact that this Court noted that the defendant in Diaz refused the testing, this 
Court appears to hold that implied consent cannot be withdrawn. These conclusions 
are manifestly wrong in light of clear United States Supreme Court precedent regarding 
the State's burden to prove consent. Thus, Diaz must be overruled. 
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II. 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Miindful of the district court's factual findings, Mr. Eversole asserts that the 
district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. 
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court defers to the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous 
and exercises free review over the application of the law to the facts. State v. Donato, 
135 Idaho 469,470 (2001). 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Dismiss 
Mr. Eversole filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his vehicle was not subject 
to being readily made operable at the time he was arrested. (R., p.92.) Specifically, 
Mr. Eversole asserted that he was stuck on a "brick burm" when law enforcement 
arrived and the vehicle could not be driven. (R., p.93.) The State objected, asserting 
that this was a determination for the jury. (R., p.107.) 
Mr. Eversole's motion was based on State v. Adams, 142 Idaho 305 (Ct. App. 
2005). In Adams, the Court of Appeals held, 
The "actual physical control" portion of the DUI statute presupposes the 
presence of a vehicle that can be controlled. The threat that is targeted by 
this part of the DUI statute is the danger that a parked vehicle will be put in 
motion by an intoxicated occupant and thereby pose a risk to the safety of 
the occupant and others. This targeted risk does not exist when the 
vehicle is not operable, nor subject to being readily made operable, nor in 
motion (whether by coasting or being pushed), nor at risk of coasting. If a 
vehicle cannot be moved it is not a motor vehicle capable of being 
"controlled," and the reason for the statutory prohibition does not exist. 
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Consequently, the statute is not violated when the vehicle is not in motion 
or susceptible of easily being placed in motion. 
Id. at 308. The court stated, "when there is evidence from which a fact-finder could 
sensibly conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being rendered operable, 
the issue is for the jury." Id. 
The court concluded that the State had established that the defendant was 
seated in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the motor running, but there was no direct 
evidence that the vehicle was capable of moving, nor any circumstantial evidence from 
which operability could be inferred. Id. The defendant had asserted that the vehicle was 
nonfunctional due to transmission problems. 
The district court made the following factual findings at the evidentiary hearing: 
In this case, the evidence is that the defendant's vehicle was stuck on a 
[burm] in front of Collet's Bar in Firth, Idaho, which is in Bingham County; 
that the officer saw the vehicle stuck on the [burm]. Two individuals were 
attempting to help get him off the [burm], and the wheels were spinning 
when he made contact. He also testified that, with some assistance, the 
vehicle could have been removed from the [burm]. 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.4-12.). The court concluded that this was akin to having a flat tire or a 
dead battery, and that "it was just a matter of getting a little more time to get [the 
vehicle] off of the [burm]. (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-25.) Therefore, the court denied the motion, 
holding that the question of operability was for the jury. 
Mindful of the fact that, "when there is evidence from which a fact-finder could 
sensibly conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being rendered operable, 
the issue is for the jury," Mr. Eversole submits that the district court erred by denying his 
motion to dismiss because the vehicle was not operable on the burm. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Eversole respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
orders denying his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this J1h day of February, 2014. 
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